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The COVID-19 pandemic has made relevant questions regarding the limits and the
justifications of sovereign power as nation states utilize high degrees of power over
populations in their strategies of countering the virus. In our article, we analyze a particularly
important facet of the strategy of sovereignty in managing the affects caused by a
pandemic, which we term the ontology of war. We analyze the way in which war plays
a significant role in the political ontology of our societies, through its aiming to produce a
unified political subject and an external enemy. Taking our theoretical cue from Butler’s
thinking on frames of recognizability we extend her theory through augmenting it with affect
theory to argue for how the frame of recognizability produced by the ontology of war fails to
guide our understanding of the pandemic as a political problem, a failure that we analyze
through looking at the affective register. We argue that the main affect that the nation state
tries to manage, in relation to the pandemic, through the ontology of war is anxiety. We
show that the nation state tries to alleviate anxiety by framing it through the ontology war,
this leads to the appearance of a potentially racist and nationalist affective climate where
the “enemy” is no longer felt to be the virus, but members of other nations as well as
minorities. We argue that the pandemic reveals both the political ontology of war central to
the foundation of our political communities, and how this ontology is used by the nation
state to manage feelings of anxiety and insecurity. Ultimately, as we will discuss at the end
of this article, this leads to failure.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the globe, the unfolding pandemic has provoked an overwhelmingly state-centric response
that seeks to deal with the negative impact that the pandemic has on a medical, social, economic, and
political level. The limits and justification of political power have thus once again become relevant
during the pandemic, in reaction to which the states are exerting their sovereignty in a highly visible
manner. Even though the worldwide pandemic, at least at first, did not bring about institutional
reforms, it definitely brought more attention to the state, which has during the pandemic been a
central institution in looking after the citizens and slowing down the rate of contagion.
The traditional narrative has been that sovereignty and law are founded on violence. This has
allowed scholars to make a distinction between sovereign power and biopower, which operate
according to different rationalities (e.g. Oksala 2010, 38; Oksala 2013, 321). Even if such a distinction
Edited by:
Dario Quattromani,













This article was submitted to
Comparative Governance,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Political Science
Received: 28 February 2021
Accepted: 15 July 2021
Published: 28 July 2021
Citation:
Lehtinen M and Brunila T (2021) A
Political Ontology of the Pandemic:
Sovereign Power and the
Management of Affects through the
Political Ontology of War.
Front. Polit. Sci. 3:674076.
doi: 10.3389/fpos.2021.674076
Frontiers in Political Science | www.frontiersin.org July 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 6740761
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 28 July 2021
doi: 10.3389/fpos.2021.674076
can be made, our discussion in this article shows that a reference to
violence is not enough to explain sovereignty. What we want to
argue in this article is that the current pandemic has illuminated an
important aspect of sovereign power that cannot be reduced to law
and violence. By this, we refer to the fact that, almost immediately,
the political crisis that followed the outbreak of the pandemic was
enveloped in a rhetoric of war to justify strong governmental
measures. This is by no means accidental. In a war-like
situation—as those inciting this type of rhetoric would want
it—strong coercive methods that contradict the rights of the
citizens must be utilized in order to stop the political system
from collapsing. As war is an exceptional situation par
excellence, many who sought to justify sovereign use of power
saw it as a clear analogy to the pandemic. Therefore, as we will
discuss in this article, in many parts of the world March 2020
brought the problem of sovereignty into focus, or made it visible in
a spectacular manner. The ongoing comparisons between the
pandemic and war are perplexing. We find it unintuitive that
war has in many contexts become one of the primary ways of
conceiving the unfolding public health crisis. War is a political and
social event par excellence, as it is a way of managing relations
between differentiated political communities, and poses, in the case
of a public health crisis, a questionable way of apprehending a
threat that does not distinguish between communities. It is this
intuition that has driven us to examine why the almost obsessively
repeated comparison of the pandemic to war has been so pre-
eminent.
In this article, we discuss the understanding of the pandemic as
a “war against an invisible enemy”, as Emmanuel Macron and
others have described the situation. It is quite obvious, as many in
the press have pointed out, that war cannot actually be fought
against an entity that lacks intentionality altogether. However, the
imagery of warfare used to describe the pandemic has been
pervasive. For example, Joe Biden declared in a speech that
the virus has “divided us, angered us, set us against one
another. I know the country’s grown weary of the fight, but
we need to remember—we’re at war with the virus, not one
another” (BBC 2020). This quote brings to the forefront the
reason why politicians wish to utilize this type of imagery. In a
war, internal tensions and conflicts must be put aside for the time
being in order to defend the nation against the enemy. To defeat
the external enemy requires unity among citizens.
Our leading thought is that the pandemic is so frequently
compared to war because it is a way to politically manage the
anxiety caused by the pandemic by giving anxiety a referent that
converts anxiety into the controllable affect of fear. As “anxiety
theorists” have claimed, fear is an affect with a determinate object
which means it can be controlled, while anxiety is a more
unfocused affect. We propose to understand this process
through Judith Butler’s philosophy regarding the framing of
situations through a political ontology. When a situation such
as the pandemic is framed, it is drawn into different frames of
recognizability that lean on different political ontologies. It is this
process of framing events through different political ontologies that
make them intelligible as political events in different ways. We
propose that it is the political ontology of war thatmust be analyzed
to understand how the pandemic is framed and that the friend-
enemy distinction of the political ontology of war produces a
specific subjectivity understood as a unified national belonging and
a specific object of fear, which is understood as the non-nationals,
different others, who are to be feared. In this way the state can then
manage the anxiety of its subjects through closing borders, limiting
movement, migration and so on. In this article, we elaborate our
understanding of the political ontology of war through a reading of
Thomas Hobbes’s and Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy. This
means that we will first establish a metatheoretical framework
through wedding “anxiety theory” to Judith Butler’s political
philosophy that we then apply on the specific political ontology
of war that we analyze through reading Hobbes and Schmitt in
order to understand the prevalence of the comparisons between the
pandemic and war.
Our intention is not to analyze only the “discourse of warfare”
as a rhetorical device or level (cf. Spadaro, 2020; Forsberg, 2020).
We want to point out that by remaining only on the level of
rhetorical analysis we risk sidestepping many important facets in
the constitution of the political and social world. Among these
facets rhetorics certainly play an important role, but we wish to
stress the need for an analysis of sovereign power, which takes
into account political ontology. Such an account brings out the
contingency of our present political configurations and their
ontological commitments. Exposing such commitments, as
Johanna Oksala emphasizes, is philosophy’s critical task.
(Oksala 2012, 19). The discourse of warfare stems from a
structure in the political ontology of communities based on
sovereignty. This means that the recurring framing of the
virus through the political ontology of war exposes how our
way of conceiving of political events is historically and affectively
conditioned by an intelligibility offered by the ontology of war.
In the first section of this article, we construct our
metatheoretical argument concerning the framing of affects by
political ontology through discussing the subfield of affect theory
known as “anxiety theory” and Judith Butler’s political philosophy.
In this section, we will first discuss the role anxiety and fear play in
the pandemic by focusing on how anxiety is turned into fear so as
to be easier controlled or managed. We will then situate the
discussion of anxiety within the context of Judith Butler’s work
on frames of recognizability to show how such frames are tied to a
conception of political ontology in her thought. This will let us
highlight how framing is tied to certain political ontologies that
produce certain kinds of political subjects.
In the second section of this article, we elaborate on the
working of the specific political ontology we label as the
political ontology of war through reading Thomas Hobbes’s
and Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy. We claim that
analyzing the governing of the pandemic must take into
account the ontological aspect of our political systems, an
aspect we label the political ontology of war. War is at the
very core of political communities that are based on the idea
of sovereignty; it is a framework of recognizability established in
order to tackle exceptional situations. Our claim is that
sovereignty is defined by a political ontology of war, which
allows for transposing anxiety into fear of a common enemy.
To be sure, the state’s role during a pandemic has transformed
multiple times during political modernity. As Foucault has
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discussed it, pandemics, such as leprosy, the plague, and
smallpox, have generated different practices of governing
(Foucault 1975, 228–233; Foucault 1976, 186; Foucault 2004,
11–12; cf. Erlenbusch-Anderson 2020, 12) Whereas the plague
called for partitioning the city space into sectors and quarantine
in some of them, smallpox called for a wholly different way of
approaching health and utilizing biopower (e.g. statistical tools,
vaccinations etc.) (Foucault 2004, 12; Lemke 2019, 192–193).
These transformations that concern biopower, the power that has
the population as an object of medical and biological practices, is
distinct from the state’s sovereign power (Foucault 1976, 181;
Foucault 1997, 214; Oksala 2010, 36; Oksala 2013, 321; Lemke
2019, 136–137; Erlenbusch-Anderson 2020, 8). Biopower, which
is not based on law in the same way as sovereign power,
complements sovereign power in the sense that it allows for
new areas of human life to be governed (Foucault 1976, 187–188;
Foucault 1997, 219–220).
Biopower does not do away with law, but it alters and
complements it with other techniques. “Biopolitical
rationality”, as Oksala points out, “treats the law as one
administrative technique among others that can be utilized to
regulate and improve the life of the population” (Oksala 2013,
322; emphasis added). Different forms of biopolitics wield
biopower1 in ways that have transformed the role of the state
and its manner of governing.2 Following Agamben’s famous
claim that sovereign power and biopower are not distinct
anymore, Sergei Prozorov claims that it “is no longer
meaningful to simply oppose biopower to sovereignty”
(Prozorov 2013, 191; cf. Agamben 1998 122). However, we
follow Oksala in her claim that even though these two forms
of power are definitely complementary and overlapping, they
should still be analyzed as distinct rationalities (2010, 38, 41–42).
Foucault points out that the problem of sovereignty regards both
the rights of the sovereign and “the legal obligation of obedience”
(Foucault 1997, 23–24). The latter refers to the role of the citizens
whomake up the sovereign political body (Foucault 1997, 30–31).
The juridical model of sovereignty establishes the legal basis of
subjectivity and the subjectification of individuals (Foucault 1997,
37–38). Similarly, even though Hobbes and Schmitt are far apart
when it comes to developments in biopolitical techniques, our
analysis focuses on what distinctly characterizes sovereign power
and what problems it faces during a pandemic. We do not mean
to deny the fact that pandemics are a concern for biopower, but,
as we have seen during the COVID-19 pandemic3, they are also a
legal issue. Biopower and sovereign power are definitely not
exclusive, but it is in our interest to analyze how sovereign
power in both Hobbes and Schmitt relies on a political
ontology, which is still relevant today and needs to be
analyzed in order to establish critical perspectives on practices
of pandemic governance.
In the third section, we will discuss how the ontology of war is
deployed in managing the anxiety caused by the pandemic. We
will first discuss the overbearing role that the nation state has
taken in leading “the offensive” against the virus, which has led to
precisely the kind of mobilization of nation state subjectivity that
the ontology of war produces. Second, we will draw attention to
how the frame established around the pandemic by the ontology
of war constantly pulls in the direction of framing the enemy, not
as the virus, but as non-nationals, foreigners and migrants. The
third argument we put forth is how the framing of the virus
through the ontology of war can misfire in such a way that
produces potential for even more anxiety, which can be seen in
the increased policing internal to communities. We end the
chapter with a discussion of the anti-lockdown movements,
which construct the nation as an object to be feared, while still
retaining elements of the kind of exclusionary framing that is
emblematic of the ontology of war.
We wish to underline that the shortcomings that the pandemic
reveal concerning the ontological basis of our sovereign political
communities also points towards a need to overcome it. The virus
is obviously not an enemy in the war-like sense of the concept, but
it did not take long to locate enemies among the people. Here, we
follow Judith Butler’s insight that “even as the war is framed in
certain ways to control and heighten affect in relation to the
differential grievability of lives, so war has come to frame ways of
thinking multiculturalism and debates on sexual freedom, issues
largely considered separate from ‘foreign affairs’” (Butler 2009,
26). As we will discuss in the third section of this article, it did not
take long for politicians to blame the situation on the people of
another state, whether it was the Chinese or—in the case of
Northern Europe—Southern European states (cf. Rafi 2020).
Locating the enemy therefore always slips into racist, hateful
and exclusive categories that allow for shifting blame and drawing
borders between friends and enemies.
Furthermore, our critical analysis is based on Butler’s insight
that, on some level, all borders between groups are fundamentally
illegitimate. Our bodies, Butler insists, are not self-subsisting
entities, but are “given over to others in order to persist”
(Butler 2020, 49). Nobody can survive without others, and
creating a limit or establishing a “frame” that separates those
to be protected from “others” is always a decision that requires
power to establish borders between different bodies. However, all
such productions, as Butler points out, are partial (2016, 7). This
applies to the pandemic as well. The states have strengthened
their border security to limit entry, but while this obviously
helped to contain the contagion, the issue of vaccine
nationalism, the dissymmetry between the ability of different
states to respond economically to limiting the circulation of
people and goods, and other inequalities between states point
towards the fact that solving the crisis triggered by the virus will
require us to transcend state borders. Even if a state has brought
down the infection rate to a halt, it has obviously not overcome
the pandemic if the rest of the world suffers from severe stages of
contagion. As we suggest at the end of this article, as social beings
we are fundamentally interconnected. Following Butler’s
1For the distinction between these two concepts see Erlenbusch-Anderson
(2020, 8).
2The most extreme and well-known example is in Foucault’s analysis of Nazism as
the generalization of biopower (Foucault 1997, 232; cf. Oksala 2013, 323; Groulx
2015, 211). [not available in Crossref, PubMed]
3For example, in Germany reforms were made to laws concerning epidemics (in
Germany, this meant the “Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer
epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite”) (Lemke 2020, 158–159, 182).
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normative idea, interconnectedness means that ultimately the
pandemic—originally meaning all (pan) people (demos)—forces
us to grapple with the political ontology that is at the core of our
political communities and transcend it.
ANXIETY, FRAMING AND POLITICAL
ONTOLOGY
As our intention is to show how the anxiety caused by the
pandemic is managed by the political ontology of war, we will
in this chapter sketch out the metatheoretical lens, through which
we will approach the issue. To build our chosen theoretical
framework we lean on affect theory in general and the subfield
of anxiety theory in particular, as it will help us understand the
affective dynamics at play in the pandemic. To understand how
affects are “captured” by socially and politically pre-given ways of
making sense of the world, which means that they can be
enveloped within certain systems of management, we turn to
Judith Butler’s theory for a concept of framing and political
ontology. With Butler’s concept of framing, we denote how
events and things such as the pandemic are pulled in by
political and historical shared networks of meaning, which we
will denote as “political ontologies”. Through framing affects in
certain ways, these political ontologies then produce certain kinds
of subjectivities that react to situations such as the pandemic in
ways that are intelligible within the political ontology that is doing
the framing. We will now first explicate our understanding of the
affect of anxiety as we employ it in this article and after that we
will discuss how to understand the process of managing this
anxiety through linking it to a reading of Judith Butler’s
conception of framing and ontology.
We have chosen to focus on anxiety in particular, as we will
argue it is one of the defining affects of the moment, which will
help us to better understand the political dynamics of the present
moment. In our analysis, we are not engaging the so-called
“pandemic anxiety”, framed as a medical or psychological
issue (see for example Allespach et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020;
McElroy et al., 2020), but anxiety understood as a generalized
social and political issue that has to do with the affective register
of human coexistence. As Massumi (2015b notes 124), an affect is
not the subjective content of human life, it is formed by a
relational field that overflows the individual and it has to do
with a collective emotional substratum lodged within coexistence.
Affects are moreover formed in an unthematized way and feed on
the collective memories of society that resemble those experiences
that society goes through in the present moment. Affects lodge
themselves into these memories and produce collective emotions
that form a blend of older sedimentations and life in the present.
These affects push the subject towards the future and open
possible ways for the subject to act and react, which are not
necessarily in line with the logic of linear time (see for example
Massumi 2015a, 194).
There is a growing literature that conceptualizes the present
age as affectively supercharged by anxiety. This signifies “a
widespread sense of loss of control and alienation, alongside
more general feelings of cultural and/or national loss,” which is
linked “to the significant deadly powers of nuclear weapons,
pandemics, or climate change, the uncertain random violence of
terrorism or cyber war, or the precariousness brought about by a
weakening welfare state in conditions of globalization in the
North” (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020, 243). The role anxiety has
played in relation to political events has been the object of
research for example in relation to terrorism (e.g. Huddy
et al., 2005), nationalism and racism (for example Hirvonen
2017) and recently in relation to climate change (for example
Robbins and Moore 2013) and has begun to form its own
microcosm of “anxiety theory” (see Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020,
242; Hunt 2009, 509). As an anxiety-inducing event, the
pandemic has thus landed in the middle of a milieu already
laden with pre-existing anxieties.
As an affect, anxiety can be characterized by being an
“unpleasant and aversive state” (Eysenck 1992) that prompts
the persons experiencing it to seek out a threat in their
environment. However, what is important to note is that
anxiety is characterized by uncertainty regarding its object
(Steenbergen and Ellis 2006). Anxiety “involves uncertainty
about the consequences of a threat that is not present and
may not occur” (Ledoux 2016, 31). This is echoed by the way
that anxiety has been conceptualized by philosophers from
Kierkegaard (see Kierkegaard 1981) and Heidegger (for a
discussion see Magrini 2006) to Sartre (Sartre 2007) as an
affect that, in relation to fear, lacks a specific intentional object
(for a discussion see Freeman and Elpidorou 2020). This
definition has been reworked by Ekhlund et al. to a definition
of anxiety where “the object of danger or fear is either absent/
non-identifiable, or in such a proximity that no reassurance can
be offered” (Eklundh et al., 2017, 5). In our opinion, there can be
no doubts about the coronavirus being a potent trigger for
anxiety. The virus is a perfect target for anxiety, as it is
neither living nor dead, and potentially very close or very far.
Public health crises such as viral pandemics create the perfect
conditions for widespread anxiety.
That public health crises are potent triggers of anxiety has been
noted for example by Albertson and Gadarian (2015) who, in
their discussion of the H1N1 - influenza (the “swine flu”) in 2019,
distinguish between framed and unframed triggers of anxiety.
Unframed triggers are triggers that involve an immediate and
concrete danger to life (a concrete attack by terrorists, for
example) and are in this sense more general than framed
triggers, which are events that have passed through a process
of social coding (the War on Terror as a way to socially code
terror attacks, for example). What they find is that “Public health
scares often trigger widespread anxiety, whereas framed threats
involve more subjective or temporally removed harms that
generate anxiety for some” (Albertson and Gadarian 2015, 63).
This is in line with the theoretical figure of anxiety as something
that lacks clear intentionality and signifies a general
precariousness and fear as something with a specific and fixed
object. Anxiety thus leads to a situation where “subjects have lost
their stabilizing anchor, their ability to sustain a linear narrative
through which they can answer questions about doing, acting,
and being,” which naturally leads subjects on the path to
“constantly seeking this always elusive state of perfect security”
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(Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020, 246). For our argument it is
important to note that one such possibility of alleviating
anxiety is through transposing “anxieties into identifiable
objects of fear” (ibid., see also Kinnvall 2004). Effectively this
means that anxiety is managed by giving it a common referent
that identifies the object to be feared for the subject. This alleviation
happens as Cossarini notes because “fears, once identified as such,
can be controlled” (Cossarini 2017, 146). The objects that come to
be chosen to represent the object of fear are in no way arbitrarily
chosen, as Bourke (2007) and Weiss (2012) have shown. Instead,
they are constituted in an evolving social-historical elaboration; the
objects that get established as objects to be feared thus vary
depending on socio-cultural milieu. The objects of fear are thus
linked to networks of social and shared historical meaning in which
the object of fear enters the realm of politics through being
something that can be politically managed or controlled. We
will denote these networks of social and shared historical
meaning as political ontologies. It is through the process of
framing that political ontologies are impressed upon things. In
our case the anxiety that stems from the pandemic will become
framed through the political ontology of war, which turns the
unframed trigger of anxiety into the framed object of fear,
subsequently to be controlled.
The affective field does not vanish when framed. Rather, it is
modified, as anxiety is modified to fear, in a way that produces a
certain kind of subjectivity. Thus, the attachment of any signifier
to the anxiety caused by the virus can relieve it by giving it a
referent. The virus is invisible, it does not offer itself as an
intelligible object of fear in the same sense that the army of
the enemy would do. In addition to this, we have to note that the
anxiety that fear of the virus triggers is first and foremost
confronted in meetings with and between people in so far as it
is other people who carry the virus in their bodies and transmit it
through their bodies. The virus can thus be carried by anyone, or
by no one at all, which means that any human can be experienced
as a threat. We clearly do not think that all our fellow human
beings are enemies. It is rather the invisibility of the virus and its
character as an “unobject” that causes anxiety, and whichmakes it
possible that the object that gets chosen to be the object of fear can
be localized to an infinite amount of different positions within the
social world. The object which will become the nodal point to
which the anxiety caused by the virus will be cathected is, as we
noted, not an arbitrarily chosen object. In the case of the
pandemic, it is given to us, through the frame of
recognizability established by the ontology war of the nation state.
We will now shortly situate our discussion within the context
of Judith Butler’s political philosophy to explain how the process
of framing an affective situation leans on political ontology and
produces subjects that then react to social and political events
framed through a certain political ontology. Here, we work with
the understanding of political ontology that Judith Butler has
elaborated. According to her, referring “to ‘ontology’ in this
regard [...] is not to lay claim to a description of fundamental
structures of being that are distinct from any and all social and
political organizations. On the contrary, none of these terms exist
outside of their political organization and interpretation.” (Butler
2009, 2.) This means that the understanding of ontology that we
and Butler are operating with is one which moves away from
understanding political ontology as uncovering a truth about
politics. Instead, we commit to an understanding offered by
Markell (see Markell 2003), of which Chambers and Carver
argue that it also applies to Butler’s thinking, that ontology
can be understood in a way “that already inflects it toward the
political register: an implicit or explicit interpretation of the
fundamental conditions of life in the social and political
world, the kinds of things that exist [in that world], and the
range of possibilities that [that world] bears” (Chambers and
Carver 2008, 104). As such, political ontology simply denotes the
historically constituted political things that are taken to exist,
their relations, effects, and the range of possibilities that these lead
to. Understood in this sense, political ontology comes to
constitute a social and political network of meaning that binds
together and determines the way humans structure and
understand the social and political world and events that have
to do with it. Natural events such as pandemics can thus be
framed through the political ontologies of a given society, which
constitute what Butler calls a “frame of recognizability”. In
Frames of War Butler makes use of this kind of notion of
ontology to investigate how life becomes constituted as visible
and grievable, through understanding how the production of
ontology generates ontologies of the subject. Our project takes a
similar kind of understanding of how political ontology
influences the actor as its starting point. However, we will not
look at grievability or life, but at how certain kinds of
subjectivities of the ontology of war emerge during the
pandemic as an answer the anxiety felt in society.
According to Butler, the frames that bring political ontology to
bear on different situations produce differentiation and “organize
visual experience” (one could also think of Ranciere’s partage du
sensible here) but over and above this, they also “generate specific
ontologies of the subject” (2009, 3). The subjects constituted by the
process of framing are according to Butler furthermore not to be
understood as simply effects of power, they are a changing whole in
which the reiterations of framing “produce and shift the terms
through which subjects are recognized” (ibid. 3–4). Framing, or
producing recognizability, thus entails that there is some kind of
prior intelligibility that the framing taps into, otherwise the framing
would just seem alien to us and would not move us to act as
subjects. Butler importantly underscores how affects are implicated
in the subject’s response to events in the world, they influence our
interpretation of situations: “Interpretation does not emerge as the
spontaneous act of a single mind, but as a consequence of a certain
field of intelligibility that helps to form and frame our
responsiveness to the impinging world” (Butler 2009, 34).
Affects thus exert an immediate influence over subjects that
criss-cross different temporalities and are nourished by the past
of social life, a past that can be understood as taking part in the
political ontology of present societies. We can link the affective
dimension of social life to political ontologies through the power
that institutionalized frameworks of intelligibility have on
individuals by referring to what Butler calls the “passionate
attachments” that bind subjects to their frameworks (for a
longer discussion see Thiem 2008, 37–50). Institutionalized
frameworks constituting political ontologies, such as the nation
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state, work through producing subjects that reproduce the
framework producing these subjects, or as Butler puts it,
“frames are subject to an iterable structure: they can only
circulate by virtue of their reproducibility” (Butler 2009, 24)
which means that the action undertaken on the basis of these
frames also reproduces the subjects produced by the frames. As
Thiem notes, this Butlerian view on the reproduction of subjects
means that we cannot access what subjects are outside of the frames
forming them (Thiem 2008, 22). This does however not constitute
a reduction of what a subject can be to a normalization of subjects
conforming to institutionalized frameworks of intelligibility as the
framework that “forms the subject is not an integrated and
harmonious network” (Butler 2015, 44). This is to say that
there are multiple possible frameworks of intelligibility and
“passionate attachments” to such frameworks present in society
among which some “are culturally prevalent and dominant; others
are relegated to the margins” (Thiem 2008, 25). Would this not be
so, critique would be constitutively blocked and we would be
doomed to repeat a single political ontology ad infinitum. Hence,
the Butlerian affective subject being reproduced by political
ontologies comes to being as an always historical subject (for
further discussion, see Shams 2020, 43–44).
THE POLITICAL ONTOLOGY OF WAR
This section analyses the basic structure of the political ontology of
war, which we claim to mark a distinctive way in which sovereign
political communities are constituted. Based on the theory of anxiety
laid out above, our idea is to elaborate on a political ontology that
brings out structures that are relevant for an analysis of sovereignty
in a time of pandemic. The point is not to explain exhaustively what
sovereignty essentially is—we are not analyzing the ontology of
sovereignty—but to describe a political ontology of war as the basis
of certain practices of sovereign power. The outcome of this section
is to elaborate on a political ontology of political communities that
are constructed around the possibility of war and certain practices
that anticipate and counter this possibility of war—an ontology that
produces specific kinds of subjectivities for the political community.
The reason why we want to analyze theories about sovereignty,
and not the state as such is because we’re less interested in concrete
practices and institutions (such as the army) andmore interested in
analyzing the political ontology that produces the basis of a political
community that gives legitimacy to the state.4 Theories of
sovereignty claim that the state is not only a monopoly of the
means of violence, but a legitimate one at that. Sovereignty, as we
will point out, is about striving to produce consent to the sovereign
order. The different theories that placed sovereignty at the center of
political communities believed that sovereignty needs to appear
different from mere monopolies of violence. Books like the
Leviathan are specifically meant to establish the legitimacy of
state power. In The Social Contract, Rousseau pointed out that
“a pistol in the hand [of a bandit] is also a power,” but this type of
power is very different from sovereign power (Book I, iii).
Sovereignty, it is claimed, requires securing (at least minimal)
consent of those subjected to sovereign power in order to establish
its difference from a mere criminal organization. We will discuss
this aspect in more detail below.
Sovereignty as a concept is about locating the basis of order
within a political community, which becomes especially relevant
during extraordinary circumstances.5 Theories of sovereignty
deal with exceptional situations and they have been theorized
under exceptional circumstances: from civil wars religious
(Bodin) and political (Hobbes) to class struggles (Schmitt).
Perhaps during the pandemic new theories of sovereignty will
emerge—and perhaps this article will anticipate their becoming.
Essential for governing during an exceptional situation is
maintaining unity within the political community. Such a
unity is, for practical reasons, neither absolute nor universal.
Sovereign power could not operate if it had to secure complete
unanimity for every one of its actions. Rather, the unity we are
referring to is what founds the legitimacy of sovereign power to
begin with and not specific actions. As Rousseau declares,
governing might mean majority rule most of the time but, in
order for the political community to be sovereign, it “assumes that
on one occasion there has been unanimity” (Rousseau 2008, I,
§v). Unity here then means a normative concept that seeks to
limit civil unrest to a minimum.6 As Schmitt claims, “plurality”
within a state becomes something that can only be tolerated to the
extent that it does not destroy the political unity (Schmitt 1932/
4For this reason, we are also talking about a subject that is different from Foucault’s
lectures on governing populations. We agree with Foucault that sovereignty is
relevant in understanding how within a population certain things circulate (2004).
In our case, it is the circulation of affects. However, whereas Foucault was
interested in how populations became an object of science and power in
tandem, we are more interested in the latter aspect. For example, when it
comes to vaccinations Foucault is interested in the entanglement of science and
regulation, whereas we are focused on the ontological basis of such political
phenomena as vaccine nationalism.
5The exceptional is always potential or else the justification for sovereign power
within a civil society would become void. This means that state of nature (or
exception) is never fully resolved, because if social negativity were to be overcome
completely, the need for sovereignty would cease. This reciprocal role of the state of
nature creates a difficulty in interpreting sovereignty’s relationship with the state of
nature. Agamben’s interpretation is that the “identity of the state of nature and
violence [. . .] justifies the absolute power of the sovereign” (Agamben 1998, 35).
According to Sergei Prozorov, one prominent line of interpreting this issue—most
notably by Agamben and Esposito—is by interpreting it so that there is always a
“remainder” of the state of nature within society that cannot be transcended
completely (Prozorov 2015, 59). Hobbes, in particular, is an “illustrative or striking
example of a tendency in modern political thought to constitute and legitimize
authority by conjuring the negativity that it then interprets as natural and seeks
protection from” (Prozorov 2015, 58; cf. Helmisaari 2020, 23). The fiction of the
state of nature is meant to give legitimacy to the sovereign, and as a fiction, it is not
natural but a potentiality that establishes the justification for sovereignty
(Helmisaari 2020, 63). Therefore, as Agamben claims in Homo Sacer,
potentiality is essential to sovereign power (Agamben 1998, 46–47). According
to Derrida, 2005, this “allows at one and the same time for war to be waged at the
political’s condition of possibility without it being for all that, in any respect, the
aim, the finality or even the content of the political” (2005, 126).
6In The Social Contract Rousseau writes that “the sole means that they still have of
preserving themselves is to create, by combination, a totality of forces sufficient to
overcome the obstacles resisting them, to direct their operation by a single impulse,
and make them act in unison” (Book 1, vi).
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2015, 42). According to him, the methods the state has at its
disposal are essentially instituted for the function of “making
uniformity possible and its daily restoration” (Schmitt 1928/1995,
37). Obviously, the sovereign’s strive towards unity can
practically never be complete, but it is still central to
legitimizing its practices that try to minimize protests and dissent.
Our argument is that transposing anxiety into fear is a crucial
mechanism in producing and upholding this type of original
unity. In order to achieve this, we elaborate on a political
ontology that is centred on war. This is not an analysis of
war and its ontology, but a political ontology centred on the
possibility of war. During a war, the citizens must remain
unified against the enemy. A political community, to hold
the enemy at bay and deter a war from happening, must also
remain unified in a pacified situation. Similarly, slowing down
the pandemic necessitates the citizens to consent to the methods
being used to slow down the rate of infection. We will elaborate
on this political ontology by analysing its role in theories of
sovereignty. Hobbes is obviously crucial here but so too is Carl
Schmitt, the legal theorist who introduced the problematic of
sovereignty into the 20th century and who infamously claimed
that the political is the distinction between friend and enemy.
We will first look at Hobbes as the basis of a theory of
sovereignty and how anxiety relates to it. A similar study in
a much more extensive manner has been done by Bahar
Rumelili (2020), who argues that anxiety is central in
Hobbes’s understanding of the state of nature. Next, we
analyse Schmitt’s theory of the enemy as a paradigm example
of how enmity is crucial for a political community.
The state of nature as the war of all against all is not a state
of constant fighting but the “disposition” to do so. As there is
no common power to prohibit fighting it is always a potential
possibility, so that “every man is Enemy to every man.” (XIII, §
62.) The problem that individuals face in a state of nature is not
that life is constant fighting but the lack of trust towards
others. Since all are equal in capacities in a state of nature, it is
not specific individuals that cause the lack of trust as the
feeling of uncertainty is constant. Even those who would
otherwise be content with modest means, Hobbes claims,
will have to amass more power simply for their own
security (XIII, § 61). Lack of trust and the experience of
insecurity forces people to remain in the disposition of war,
which is not directed against anyone in particular. Such a
situation can be best analysed through our analysis of anxiety.
As Ruhelili writes, “the ‘perpetual fear’ generated by the
unknowability of the future and limits of human knowledge
make not only self-preservation at present, but also the
foresight of future self-preservation an ultimate concern”
(2020, 263). In a state of nature, the experience of
uncertainty and insecurity is constant and it has no specific
object that would cause it. Hobbes writes precisely that in a
state of nature there is no “common Power to feare.” The
sovereign is that power which establishes consent through fear,
that is, manages anxiety by framing it into fear of punishment.
However, it is not only fear of the sovereign that frames
anxiety. What is so crucial about defining war as a disposition
is that it basically means that even when there’s no fighting, a war
might still be taking place.7 As Hobbes claims, the state of nature
does exist between states, so that they are “in continual jealousies,
and in the states and posture of Gladiatiors; having their weapons
pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another” (Hobbes 2018,
XIII, § 63). A disposition to fight remains between states, and it is
this disposition that the citizens should be aware of at all times. As
commentators have pointed out, this allows Hobbes to further his
argument of strengthening the power of the sovereign (cf. Tuck
2001; Poole 2015; Koskenniemi 2017). The existence of enemy
states necessitates certain capacities, such as collecting taxes for
maintaining an army.More important for our argument, however, is
that the existence of an external enemy establishes uniformity within
a political community. As Hobbes writes, the objective of the
institution of sovereignty is “the peace of the subjects within
themselves, and their Defence against a common enemy”
(Hobbes 2018, XXI, § 111). Without a common enemy,
according to Hobbes, the citizens would become restless and fight
against one another. It is not only the sovereign that the citizensmust
fear but the enemy as well. The sovereign, in order to maintain
stability, must frame the anxiety of the citizens into a fear of an
enemy that is external to the community. The sovereign therefore
externalizes mistrust among citizens into an enmity towards another
state. It is precisely this type of externalization of anxiety that frames
it as fear of a specific object that legitimates sovereign power.8
Theories of sovereignty tend to link violence and power
together, if not completely equate them.9 Without sovereign
power, there is no order that would limit the disposition to
fight. (Hobbes 2018, XIII, § 62–63.). Coercive power is essential
because words alone are not enough to create obligations (Hobbes
7Further, Nordin and Öberg (2015) criticize theories that equate war with the
concrete event of fighting.
8The need for security implies a state of insecurity that justifies the establishment of
a political system. As Achille Mbembe succinctly summarizes this, “the security
state thrives on a state of insecurity” (Mbembe 2019, 54). Rousseau - another
theorist of sovereignty - puts it thus: “What is the purpose of political association?
The security and prosperity of the associates” (Rousseau 2008, III, § ix.) There is
definitely disagreement among different theories of sovereignty. One example is
the famous disagreement between Hobbes and Rousseau concerning what
constitutes security and what kinds of powers can be justified. Notwithstanding
these differences, as Frédéric Gros elaborates, both Hobbes and Rousseau are in
unison about the centrality of the concept of security in their political theories, and
about the essential difference between the state of nature and civil state (Gros 2019,
75). Similarly, our point is to bring out a basic understanding of the political
ontology that is essential to political communities of sovereignty—not to analyze
the finer details of these thinkers. “Security,” Gros emphasises, “is simultaneously
as the principle of the state’s foundation, the ultimate cause behind civil societies,
the source of legitimacy for the authorities, and the objective of instituting political
communities” (Gros 2019, 76). Security then justifies both the institution and the
constitution of a state and allows for evaluating the state’s functioning.
9Because of the obvious authoritarian implications of this link, Arendt makes a
clear distinction between power and violence so that “power springs up whenever
people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial
getting together rather than from any action that thenmay follow.” This means that
consensus creates power, but the power over means of violence can never
reflectively create consensus (Arendt 1969, 37, 52–54.). Derrida’s succinct
description is worth quoting here: “The abuse of power is constitutive for
sovereignty” (Derrida 2003). Similarly, Joan Cocks, 2014 discusses sovereign
power as a form of “foundational violence” (47ff).
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2018, XIV, § 63–64). “Covenants, without the Sword, are but
Words, of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 2018, XVII,
§ 85). Without coercive power, everyone is in a situation to “make
warre upon each other for their particular interests” (Hobbes
2018, XVII, § 87) because in a state of nature nobody has any
reason to fear punishment for misdeeds (XVII, § 85–86), whereas
in a state the sovereign has coercive means to force people to hold
on to their covenants (XIV, § 71). The only way to establish a
Commonwealth, which is able to defend from invasion and
injury, is to transfer all power to the sovereign who will
“reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will”,
that is, to form the sovereign is to submit will and judgement to
the sovereign (Hobbes 2018, XVII, § 87). Following this
formulation, sovereignty is about interpreting power as
coercion, of which Foucault summarizes succinctly that “law is
always referred to as a sword” (Foucault 1976, 189).
It is true that the state has a power over its subjects’ lives due to
its monopoly on legitimate means of violence. To quote Schmitt:
“The state as the substantial political unity has an immense power
concentrated in itself: the possibility to lead a war and thereby
usually to command over the life of the people” (Schmitt 1927/
1988, 70; Schmitt 1932/2015, 43).10 When it comes to the internal
issues within state territory—and this is crucial—the state has
complete powers to ensure “peace, security and order” and
therefore to “establish the normal situation.” (Schmitt 1932/
2015, 43.) Therefore, sovereignty is about establishing a space
within which internal conflicts become de-legitimized. This is due
to the fact—which Agamben would describe as “thanatological”
and Mbembe as “necropolitical” (Agamben 1998; Mbembe 2019;
cf. Balke 2005; Oksala 2013, 321)—that the sovereign has the right
to sanction and punish those unwilling to limit themselves.
However, we are neither interested in a general discussion
regarding security nor in looking at sovereignty merely as a
centralization of the means of violence. In order for a state to
be sovereign, a lot more than weaponry is required. Unlike
Foucault’s summarization in the quote above, law is not based
on mere coercion but those subjected to it need to consent to it.
This requires specific forms of subjectivities and therefore an
analysis of security must also take into account the context of
framing affects. The casting of the feeling of insecurity is central
here. Sovereignty is not established merely through violence but
through a political ontology that wards off anxiety. As Rumelili
points out, even for Hobbes fear needs an object and therefore it is
produced politically (Rumelili 2020, 263). Here, we analyse giving
anxiety an object or referent, that is, an enemy, based on which a
political ontology of war transposes anxiety and the feeling of
insecurity into a fear that then legitimates the existence of a
sovereign. Once anxiety is framed as a fear of an object, that is the
enemy, what emerges is subjectivity that consents to state power,
thus making it sovereign. As we will point out below in this
section, the possibility of war is what frames these affects.
As we pointed out above, sovereignty is connected to
producing consent to political power. From the perspective of
those who wield sovereign power, the lack of dissent or, at the
very least, limiting it to a bearable minimum, allows for the
smooth functioning of its practices. What sovereign power needs
is to manage dissent to a minimum that is bearable. In order to do
this, sovereign power has to at least appear as if it was based on
some form of consent. This does not mean a constant need of
unanimity but, instead, using a very weak form of consent as a
way to delegitimize all who oppose the operations of sovereign
power. Theorizing politics through the concept of sovereignty, to
quote de Lagasnerie, “essentially works by countering protest
movements and mobilizations by reminding them of the political
order” (de Lagasnerie 2020, 59). Violence used by the state and
against it are both forms of violence, but from the perspective of
sovereign power state violence is legitimate because it is used to
minimize illegitimate violence. As Katrin Meyer points out, “the
socially destructive force of violence becomes a normatively
justifiable praxis only when it can legitimize itself as violence
against violence” (Meyer 2016, 51). For distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate violence, as we will point out next,
consent needs to be defined in a weak sense.
Hobbes’s understanding of consent, which is crucial for our
argument, is that covenants that have been agreed to under fear
are valid (XIV, § 69).11 Humans act in order to gain something or
avoid harm, and therefore to avoid something out of fear is
consistent with an individual’s will (XXI, § 108). The political
order and its maintenance necessitate that subjects limit their
freedom as humans, because “as long as every man holdeth this
Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the
condition ofWarre” (Hobbes 2018, XIV, § 65). The establishment
of the commonwealth and sovereignty means the creation of an
obedient subject that is willing to limit itself for the sake of
political order (XIV, § 65; XVI, § 79–80). The state of nature
produces consent and agreement, because “all men agree on this,
that Peace is Good and therefore also the way, or means of Peace”
(XVI, § 80). To be a citizen therefore is to act according to the
different obligations such as not to dissent, in order to secure
peaceful coexistence. It is true, to quote Foucault, that consent in
this context can be interpreted as the preference to favor life over
death (Foucault 1997, 82). Whereas in a state of nature, where
nobody had any reason to fear punishment for misdeeds (XVII, §
85–86), in a state the sovereign has coercive means to force people
to hold on to their covenants (XIV, § 71). However, to understand
how consensus is established, an analysis of the “thanatological”
or “necropolitical” aspects of sovereignty is not enough, as we
have pointed out above. Instead, the sovereign must frame
anxiety as fear of an external enemy.
10As Foucault points out, theories of sovereignty posit sovereignty as a power that
unites and as the “unity of power” (Foucault 1997, 37).
11Here we agree with Foucault’s idea that the Leviathan’s core idea is that the fact of
civil society reigning and the state of nature not being at hand means that subjects
have consented to the covenant. The possibility of the state of nature, therefore,
provides a valid consent that legitimizes sovereignty (Foucault 1997, 84–85; cf. de
Lagasnerie 2020, 61.). Foucault’s idea is therefore that the concept of the state of
nature allows for de-legitimizing rebellion, and to claim that not rebelling implies
consent (Foucault 1997, 83–84; cf. Hobbes 2018, XX, § 103–104; de Lagasnerie
2020, 57). Similarly, Schmitt claims that the only reason to submit to somebody is
security and protection through power. “Who looks for protection and accepts it,
does not have to right, to refuse obedience.” (Schmitt 2017, 14.)
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This brings us to the political ontology of war, which refers to
how the legitimacy of this subjection is established. The political
ontology of war is not an ontology of war as an event, but an
ontology of sovereignty and its justifications that are founded on
the possibility of war. As Schmitt points out, “war is neither the aim
nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But, as a real
possibility, it is an ever-present presupposition [Voraussetzung],
which determines in a characteristic way human action and
thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behaviour.”
(Schmitt 1932/2015, 33; cf. Kennedy 1998, 101.) the possibility of
war is essential to the political as such. Therefore, this means that
war itself is not the content or the aim of politics, since war is only a
means to reach a certain goal, but, rather, it defines the structure of
the political as such.
This is what brings us to Schmitt’s definition of the political as the
distinction between friends and enemies (Schmitt 1927/1988, 69;
Schmitt 1932/2015, 26).War establishes specific forms of vertical and
horizontal relationships. A political unity assumes (setzt voraus) the
real possibility of an enemy (Schmitt 1932/2015, 50). The political is
about the possibility of a concrete political formation. As Schmitt
states, the political is the “real possibility of grouping friends and
enemies”, that is, “based on the power of [the political unity’s]
decision, the real possibility in a certain situation to determine the
enemy and fight against it” (Schmitt 1927/1988, 69; Schmitt 1932/
2015, 42). The actuality of a political unity is based on the possibility
of war, so that if this possibility were to be removed, that is, “when the
real possibility of struggle is ruled out and every friend and enemy
grouping has become impossible” (Schmitt 1927/1988, 73; Schmitt
1932/2015, 33, 52). The enemy is someone against whom “in extreme
cases a conflict is possible” (Schmitt 1932/2015, 26), so that the enemy
becomes an opponent and not merely different in some lesser sense.
The enemy is always a public one - “a private citizen has no political
enemy” (Schmitt, 1927/1988, 72) - because only the political unity has
the strength to make that distinction.
The contradiction between the political unity and its enemy has to
be understood in the context of war. Not all nations, Schmitt points
out, are capable of waging war and therefore they are no longer
political in the proper sense. The political unity is properly political
only when it has the possibility to engage in warfare against its
enemies. (1927/1988, 69–70; cf. Pankakoski, 2017, 657–658). In a
civil war, if the contradiction between internal opponents becomes so
intense that no one is strong enough to take over the capacity to
decide over war and peace, then the political unity ceases to exist.
Either there is a force that is capable of establishing a political unity,
which means having the means to fight against an enemy and being
strong enough to distinguish between friends and enemies, “or [the
political unity] is in general not at hand.” (Schmitt 1932/2015, 37; cf.
Kennedy 1998, 100.) Here, many scholars have pointed out that
Schmitt’s background in establishing this definition of the political
comes as a reaction to the Versailles treaty’s limits to the Weimar
Republic’s sovereignty and his attempt to argue for national unity in
the face of domestic political tensions (cf. Balakrishnan 2000, 114;
Kennedy 2004, 106–107; Kervégan 2011, 176–179). An enemy is
therefore central to producing national unity. This means that the
distinction between friends and enemies dictates that conflicts
among friends can never be legitimate because they would
threaten the capacity of the political unity to fight against the
enemy. To go against this distinction, Schmitt emphasizes, means
to “place oneself in the order of things on the side of the enemy”
(Schmitt 1932/2015, 49).
There is nothing extraordinary about this interpretation of
Schmitt’s theory of the political.12 Mouffe (2005), for example,
describes the Schmittian idea of the enemy as the “constitutive
other” of a political unity. Without exclusion - the idea claims -
there is no identity. However, what we wanted to point out was
that the Schmittian distinction is one that produces unity through
the possibility of war. The sovereign, with the capacity to wage
war, upholds the unity among friends in order to defend against
the enemy. It is the existence of the enemy that necessitates unity.
As we have already analyzed, the fear of the enemy is central to
producing this unity. Internal conflicts and exceptional situations
must be deterred in order to remain unified against the enemy.
This is the main take-away that we get from Schmitt’s attempt to
defend state sovereignty. War is at the heart of political
communities and evoking it means to uphold unity and
produce consent. Therefore, the enemy is designated to govern
effectively and ward off internal tensions.
The issue with the political ontology of war is that the uniformity
of citizens is achieved by turning them against an enemy. As has
been evident during the pandemic, for many it was not the virus that
was the enemy, but some other group of people who are allegedly
irresponsible when it comes to slowing down the pandemic. A
notorious example was the former president of the United States,
Donald Trump, who infamously called COVID-19 a “chinese virus”
(Liu 2020; Rafi 2020). We will discuss this in more detail below but
let us state here the obvious and say that an enemy is not a necessary
requirement for mutual cooperation among the citizens.
The pandemic as an exceptional situation is, of course, not
completely unique. The pandemic is not the event that has finally
made us realize the political ontology of our political
communities. Instead, similar types of framing do take place
in other exceptional situations as well. For example, in the “war
against terror” after the 9/11 attacks similar framing of affects can
be seen. Joanne Esch has analyzed how in the political discourse
after the attacks the rhetoric of war seeks to establish a traditional
civilization vs barbarism -distinction in order to normalize and
legitimize certain state actions (Esch 2010, 386; cf.; Ditrych 2013).
Similarly, based on Arendt’s political theory, Elizabeth Young-
Bruehl makes a point similar to ours that the attacks in 2001 were
“immediately analogized to Pearl Harbor. In a flash, the
American people were encouraged to assume that the
American response should be war, as though al-Qaeda were a
nation state like Japan.” (Young-Bruehl 2008, 13.)13 The anxiety
caused by terrorism was managed by locating a public enemy,
against which a war could be waged. As Scheuerman points out,
the discussion regarding Schmitt’s ideas was revitalized after the
12For a detailed discussion of Schmitt’s understanding of war, see Pankakoski
(2017); Teschke 2016.
13Also from the Arendtian perspective, Joan Cocks writes from the Arendtian
perspective on how traditional ideas regarding sovereignty were present in USA’s
war on terrorism as “an actual war against a weak sovereign state as a substitute for
its shadowy antagonist” (2014, 24).
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start of the war on terror (Scheuerman, 2017, 560–561). However,
our point is not to say that the pandemic has once again made
reading Schmitt relevant, but that sovereignty as a concept that is
distinct from biopolitical considerations should once again
become a relevant object of inquiry.14
Lastly, the political ontology of war is about the
management of affects relevant to the unity of the political
community. Hobbes infamously claimed that the sovereign
must have power over the intellectual doctrines within a state.
For the sake of security, the sovereign must produce
consensus. Schmitt notes that there can be unity through
both power and consensus. “Real power produces true
consensus and true consensus produces true power.”
(Schmitt 1933/1958, 370.) However, Schmitt sees it so that
during exceptional times when the political unity is
threatened the former is preferred. The central question
then becomes, who is the sovereign that has the authority
to uphold unity during an exceptional situation (Schmitt
1930, 35.) As we claim below, this means that the
sovereign must rule over and manage the political affects
of the citizens. As Schmitt claims, humans are susceptible to
affects and therefore in need of governing to remain united
(1932/2015, 55).
Therefore, to conclude, the political ontology of war is
about recognizing the differences between subjects. As
Butler points out, the logic of war functions at the basis of
our political communities to “distinguish lives worth
safeguarding from those that are not—populations
conceived as collateral damage, or as obstructions to policy
and military aims” (2020, 62). This ontological aspect is based
on establishing war as a potentiality, which then justifies
certain institutions and exclusion of certain subjects from
those that are to be protected. Important here is the
concept of the enemy, the definition of which is supposed
to help distinguish those subjects that are under the protection
of the sovereign. We want to analyze the ontological and
affective aspects of this issue to better understand the basis
of the utilization of the rhetoric of war during the pandemic.
To wage war against the virus means to demand the political
community to act together and unanimously to defeat its
enemy. For example, Macron has called on unity among
citizens in the face of the war against the virus (Le Monde
2020) and massive state-sponsored informational campaigns
around the globe have interpellated citizens to act responsibly
and in a unified manner. The political ontology of war is
therefore a way to identify differences between subjects, to
counter those subjects that have been deemed on the side of the
enemy, and, lastly, to establish a necessity for uniformity
among citizens.
DEPLOYING THE POLITICAL ONTOLOGY
OF WAR ON THE PANDEMIC
To sum up our discussion so far, we have argued for understanding
the virus as an event that produces anxiety, which is then framed
through political ontology to give the anxiety a referent, which turns
it into fear, an affect that can be controlled and managed. We then
attached this managing of anxiety onto a political ontology that we
analysed in the context of sovereignty. Framing anxiety as a fear of
the enemy, as we pointed out, is central to sovereign power in
general. Therefore, our argument is not that the COVID-19 virus has
once and for all revealed the essence of sovereignty because the
framing of affects we have described is neither novel nor unique to
governing during a pandemic. Instead, we argue that understanding
the production of consent in the context of sovereignty tells us
something about how our political communities operate during a
pandemic that biopolitical analyses might leave out.
Sovereign power, according to Foucault, can be formulated as the
right to take lives or to let live (“le droit de faire mourir ou de laisser
vivre”). (Foucault 1976, 178.). “Law cannot be nothing but armed, and
its weapon, par excellence, is death; for those who transgress it, law
respondswith this absolute threat, at least as a last resort. Law always is
referred to as a sword.” (Foucault 1976, 189). However, even if
sovereign power might be in some ultimate sense reducible to
violence, our discussion above has shown that a reference to
violence is not enough to explain sovereignty. As we pointed out,
framing produces a particular kind of political subjectivity. The
political ontology of war constitutes the very specific form of
framing and a concomitant ordering of social relations in our
societies. Here, war does not refer to an actual event, but forms a
central part of the political ontology that is being called on in framing
the pandemic. The possibility of war establishes a demarcation
between those subjects that are friends and those that are not.
Schmitt claims that the political unity is “definitive” in that it
defines the people that take part in it. The political unity (i.e. a
state) upholds the distinction between friends and enemies and,
therefore, upholds the definitive identity of friends, too. (Schmitt
1932/2015, 28, 41.). The existential threat of the enemy necessitates
that certain political structures, hierarchies, exceptional measures and
so on, are instituted to ward off this possibility.
In this part, we will discuss how the ontology of war is deployed in
managing the anxiety caused by the pandemic. The first phenomenon
we wish to note is the overbearing role that the nation state has taken
in leading “the offensive” against the virus, which has led to precisely
the kind of mobilization of nation state subjectivity, that the ontology
of war produces. The second phenomenon we wish to draw attention
to is how the frame established around the pandemic by the ontology
of war constantly pulls in the direction of framing the enemy, not as
the virus, but as non-nationals, foreigners and migrants. The third
phenomenon concerns how the framing of the virus also misfires in
such a way that produces a potential for even more anxiety, visible in
the increased policing internal to communities. We close this section
with some remarks on the anti-lockdown protests, which manifests a
framing that seems to lean on other frameworks that try to alleviate the
anxiety of the pandemic by framing the state to act as an object of fear
in different ways. In Butlerian terms, the virus escapes a certain
“recognizability” that the political ontology of nation state
14This means to go in a different direction than Catherine Malabou or Falk, who
both discuss sovereignty and biopolitics in tandem (Malabou 2015; Falk, 2011). As
Agamben would put it, “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity
of sovereign power” (Agamben 1998, 7).
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constitutes, as recognizability crafts a “living being into a recognizable
subject, though not without errancy or, indeed, unanticipated results.”
(Butler 2009, 5.) As the nation state constitutes a frame of
recognizability through its production of political ontology it also
produces, as Butler notes, errancy or unanticipated results, as well
as dissent. The errancy of the recognizability in relation to which the
nation state construes the position of the subject and the virus can be
understood as the “misfiring” of the framing of the virus by the nation
state, which leads to heightened anxiety.
As we have argued, anxiety can be understood as a widespread
sense of loss of control, it is felt especially in the face of situations
where the object that causes a feeling of losing control is hard to
locate. It is in the first place the threat to life that the virus poses,
and especially its hidden and potentially omnipresent character,
that causes anxiety. This is further strengthened by the material
consequences of the pandemic, financial, and social. The anxiety
that the pandemic gives rise to is ultimately based on the
unpredictability of its transmission. The pandemic has made
the concept of infection a political phenomenon. This means
trying to fit the spread of the disease into a symbolical frame that
operates by relieving the anxiety related to its uncertainty (cf.
Lohm et al., 2015). Here, our argument is that anxiety caused by
the pandemic is a serious issue for sovereignty. In order to
manage anxiety, secure social relations and avert internal
conflicts, the state needs to govern affects and ensure uniformity.
During the global pandemic in 2020, in most parts of the world,
the state has put itself in the position of the political institution
responsible for managing the pandemic.15 This is made very clear by
how strongly states have exerted their political powers by closing
down borders, limiting migration, business and the freedoms that
citizens normally enjoy in Western societies. In an exceptional
situation, as Schmitt would have it, the sovereign reveals itself
(Schmitt 1921/2015, 13). In relation to preceding contemporary
pandemics such as the H1N1, SARS, MERS, Ebola, HIV-AIDS
pandemics, or in relation to historical pandemics such as the
Spanish flu or the Black Death, the COVID-19 pandemic has
been, as Woods et al. argue, handled as “a direct function of
nationalism” as “none of the previous pandemics involved
worldwide lockdowns, cessation of normal activities and massive
state sponsored and state-controlled mitigation” (Woods et al., 2020,
811). What the pandemic seems to have revealed was that the
contemporary role of protecting citizens still belongs to the state.
However, as we have pointed out, it also revealed a central imaginary
nexus in our understanding of political institutions in the form of the
political ontology of war, with the need for the unity of the citizens
that we have already discussed. The ontology of war offers the state
an essential tool in securing a “strong national identification as their
state assumes the major responsibility to protect them during a
crisis” (Su and Shen 2021, 171. See also; Bieber 2020).
Within the nation state’s frame of reference, warfare is talked about
precisely in terms of the valiant sacrifice that citizens do for the
common good. As Schmitt would have it, political unity demands the
“readiness to die and to kill” (Todesbereitschaft und
Tötungsbereitschaft), or else it is not political in the real sense
(Schmitt 1932/2015, 43). The war against the virus therefore
produces a certain level of unity between citizens and seeks to
influence our way of acting in society, thus it seeks to limit ways
of acting that could be perceived as dissenting in relation to the
employed framing. The political ontology of war is certainly not the
only ontological founding that could produce the desired action and
manage our anxiety within the frame of reference provided by the
nation state, save for the ontology of war that we have analyzed here.16
However, it has certainly become central for a reason. The kind of
management of anxiety that the ontology of war does produces
hierarchies and obedience. In this style, Donald Trump talked
about himself as “a wartime president” (White House, 2020). The
Prime Minister of the Chezch Republic, Andrej Babiš, “seized every
opportunity to stress that the nation was fighting a war” (Kleio in
Pandemia 2020) and the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis
remarked that “we are at war with an enemywho is invisible” (Reuters
2020); many more examples could be summoned. Obedience in war
means adjusting one’s own behavior to accommodate collective needs.
War thus works through producing unity because of the historical
structures of the nation state. In the name of what other event than
war, could Macron demand “full mobilization” (Le Monde, 2020)?
Similarly, during his presidency Trump urged that “every generation
of Americans has been called to make shared sacrifices for the good of
the nation,” which he then likened to the sacrifices made during the
Second World War (The White House, 2020).
It is important to note that there is variation in the responses to
such authoritative acts of framing, both within the population and
across populations. As was noted in the first section of this article
and above, there are different frames and political ontologies
present in and between societies, which effectively means that
there can be political contexts where the framing of the pandemic
isn’t present to the extent it is in certain contexts (Sweden is
sometimes used as an example of such a context, see for example
Strang 2020; Dagens Arena 2020). It also follows that in different
contexts where the political ontology of war is used to frame the
pandemic, there will be differing levels of mobilization and
unification enacted in its name as well as differing levels of
dissent in relation to the framing (e.g. the case of Trump
provoked a backlash, see Kleiner 2020; Washington Post 2020).
The affective subject called on by the ontology of war is
naturally not performed into being solely on a command
issued by the leader of a nation, instead it has to tap into
the collective political ontology of society, its historically
constituted memory and way of understanding itself, to
bring about the kind of national subjectivization that the
pandemic has done. For example, in Finland this has been done
by tapping into “the memory of the bloody civil war, the role of
both external and internal threats to the existing societal order
during the post-World War II years, and the longstanding state-
15Regarding the pandemic and the state in the context of human rights treaties, see
Chia & Oyeniran (2020).
16As Alyeksyeyeva et al. write, “in times of crises, war rhetoric appears the most
persuasive and appealing tool to influence the collective mind of the public, since
militarisation of crisis discourse helps to restrict the recipients’ conceptualisation of
the situation to a war frame as well as undermine or marginalise other conceptual
representations of this crisis” (Alyeksyeyeva et al., 2021, 98).
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orchestrated efforts to construct a coherent nation state” (Moisio
2020, 600). For example, Sjölander-Lindqvist et al. (2020, 10) have
discussed such examples in the German and Italian context of the
pandemic response, where “historical references are made to install
a sense of community, and they all embrace the notion of active
citizenship through pointing to the role the individual plays for the
common good”. The collective memories created by these kinds of
historical understandings work together with the ontology of war
to mobilize national subjectivity, they give collectively recognizable
and affectively binding substance to the framing.
The effort of constructing the subjectivity of the ontology of war is
also echoed clearly by sentiments of national pride that underscore the
fruits of the national struggle during the pandemic, statements such as
thatmade by Italy’s primeminister Conte, who said that “Italy, we can
say it loudly, with pride, is proving to be a great nation, a great
community, united, and responsible” (quoted in Sjölander-Lindqvist
et al., 2020, 6). Appeals to the specifically excellent character of the
people of the own nation state have been circulated in a host of
national contexts, such as theDanish primeminister’s calls that Danes
“are made of particularly strong material and have a unique ability to
act driven by a sense of solidarity with other Danes” (Villadsen 2020,
230). These appeals could obviously only work against a shared
background of understanding, where being of a certain nationality
constitutes a substantial mode of political identification.
The central problemwith the political ontology of war as a way
to manage anxiety and establish uniformity is that it leads to a
feeling of hate against different groups of people, and which can
only be described as racist (Liu 2020; Rafi 2020). To manage
anxiety, the ontology of war seems to transfer the target of the
affect from the virus to another people to be feared. In the spirit of
a transubstantiation, the ontological frame that the ontology of
war constitutes has directed societies to blame the pandemic on
groups outside of one’s own community, expelling, or sealing off
such groups have been measures that have been undertaken in
order to manage anxiety. During the Black Death, Jews were
blamed for spreading the disease (Burke 2007), while the Chinese
have been made to account for the spreading of the disease during
the COVID-19 pandemic (Liu 2020).17 An infamous example
here is the former president of the US, Donald Trump, who has
been intent on attaching the anxiety to the Chinese. In a White
House press briefing (from March 18, 2020) Trump’s
introductory remarks were on “a war on the Chinese virus.”
According to him, the virus is originally fromChina and therefore
it is they who are to blame for the spreading of the virus and its
consequences.
These ways of framing events and distributing the burdens of
guilt have not come into being arbitrarily as the friend-enemy-
distinction, based on the ontology of war, is a part of the affective
ground of these frames. Racism against Asians has since been
ramped up in the US but also in Europe, as Wang summarizes
“people with Asian faces [have] in Denmark, Italy, France,
Germany, Finland, and Estonia experienced multiple forms of
xenophobia and discrimination connected with COVID-19”,
moreover “there is evidence of xenophobic rumors blaming
Muslims, Jews, Roma, and refugees for hosting the virus, even
culminating in the extreme nationalists advocating for social
exclusion” (Wang 2020, 30–31). Over and above Xenophobia
in the West, similar results have been discovered in Asia, Latin
America, and Africa, where there is growing evidence that the
“COVID-19 pandemic is affecting migrants” who have reported
on “increasing racism and xenophobia” (Dionne and Turkmen
2020, 221–222).
When subjects are formed through iteration of the frame of the
nation state, the subjects are freed from uncertainty because the
nation state promises the subjects certainty and control, at least
this is the implicit promise delivered to the citizenry. As was
discussed earlier, there will always be differing measures of
dissent and alternative frames in play, which will lead to
variation in how believable such promises of certainty and
control seem in the eyes of the citizenry. The content of this
promise is echoed strongly by Hobbes’ philosophy, where the
principal task of the sovereign is precisely to safeguard its
subjects, especially from war. The subject, that the framing
enacted by the nation state attempts to iterate, acts in this
regard all the time as though it was waiting for the nation
state to protect the subject from the dangers of war. The
impossibility of neatly localizing the virus within the frame of
the friend-enemy-distinction offered by the sovereign nation
state’s political ontology produces unclarity in the relation
between sovereign and subject. Leaning on Zevnik’s (2017,
189) theory it is possible to argue that this unclarity, which
concerns the feasibility of the sovereign’s claim to protect the
subject, will push the subject to act as the subject would expect the
sovereign to act: it will make the subjects exercise control in
regard to each other and demand ever stricter restrictions. The
aforementioned way of controlling uncertainty through enmity
now shifts in the direction of a confrontation between citizens.
The subject’s fantasy of the unlimited scope of sovereign power,
which is born of the powerlessness of the singular nation state in
the face of the virus, makes the subjects reproduce and re-enact
the sovereign’s potentially unlimited use of power, which can for
example be seen in the urge to control other citizens and the
hopes and calls for more effective restrictive measures. This kind
of dynamic testifies to the fact that managing uncertainty is not
only about localizing the enemy; it is also used as a measure to
control friends, as the aforementioned need for control between
17That Jews were persecuted as a consequence of the Black Death could be
connected to a specific political ontology at play in some parts of Medieval
Christian Europe during the epidemic in the 14th century. As Claude Lefort
has discussed, the theologico-political configuration born of theMedieval Christian
societies conceived of social unity “beneath the sign of the spiritual” (Lefort 1988,
229), the Black Death found its natural place in this theologico-political ontology as
“a divine scourge, a retribution for the sins of mankind” (Slack 2020, 436). As such
the Black Death acted as a powerful moral and political force that wrought down
God’s wrath on those groups that were Other, it “therefore predisposed men to
action of various kinds: a search for scapegoats [...] a condemnation of the infected,
especially if they were poor or otherwise disreputable” (Slack 2020, 438). As such it
should not come as a surprise that “the rhetoric of fear”, employed during this time,
“reinvigorated a latent anti-Semitism and xenophobia” (Barney and Scheck 2010,
7; for a more detailed discussion see for example; Finley and Koyama 2016). At the
same time the Black Death coincided in Christian Europe, with the “the extension
of state powers” (Slack 2020, 442), a fact stressed also by Silvia Federici who argues
that the counter-revolutions triggered by the Black Death led to the first steps taken
on the road to the absolute state (Federici 2004, 44–50).
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citizens shows. Leaning on the recognizability that the war against
the virus activates thus generates both unity and a way to use
power that are characteristic for the nation state.
The nation states have however provoked open dissent
because of their employment of restrictions and protective
measures. There has of course been an abundance of citizens
calling out the government for failing to deal with the pandemic
by not imposing more or tighter restrictions, very visibly in India
and the US for example, but there have also been waves of anti-
lockdown protests across the US and Europe. The salient feature
of the anti-lockdown protests is that the protesters take aim at the
legitimacy of the state as a political actor itself, as Gerbaudo writes
“the key grievance mobilized in anti-lockdown protests is the very
condition of the lockdown”, the “protesters participating in these
events claimed that lockdown measures were not motivated by
defense of the public good, but were rather a manifestation of a
conspiracy” (Gerbaudo 2020, 68). In many of the anti-lockdown
protests there appears to be a disconnect between the state as the
sovereign actor facing down the pandemic, and the frame of war.
The latter seems to be present, taking as its target some version of
the state, which leads to the state becoming the target of hostility,
an object to fear and resent. Construing the state as the enemy
could, in the case of anti-lockdown protests, thus be understood
to be another object to be feared in order to fend off anxiety. The
libertarian anxieties take on the state as an object of fear because
of its restrictive power over the individual. But as Bratich has
shown, such libertarian sentiments behind anti-lockdown
protests often are also congruent with the logic of the
mobilization that the nation state enacts when it shifts the
target of the virus to the person who is other. As Bratich
exemplifies, “this sentiment was found in the Texas lieutenant
governor’s infamous line ‘There are more important things than
living, and that’s saving this country for my children and my
grandchildren and saving this country for all of us.’”, here “the ‘us’
[...] is an extension of ‘my,’ invoking blood (family) and soil
(nation), while predicated on ‘the exclusion or subordination of
those outside’” (Bratich 2021, 258). This would mean that even if
the action of the state or the state itself is felt to be illegitimate
from the perspective of this framing, the ontology of war still
exerts its grip on the affects of citizens.
The ontology of war present in this general libertarian affective
attunement behind many of the anti-lockdown protests is
supercharged in those cases where it is backed up with
“conspiracies about a “deep state” and an apparent new
convergence among anti-government groups across the
political spectrum—including anti-vaxxers and flat Earthers,
QAnon conspiracy theorists, guns’ rights advocates, patriot
militias, and White supremacist extremists” a concoction that
creates a “combustive mix that brings a high risk of serious
violence” (Woods et al., 2020, 817). It would seem plausible to
argue that as these kinds of anti-statist conspiracy theories have at
their core an understanding of the “deep state” as the de facto
locus of power, they can be seen as another try at alleviating the
anxiety that is reactivated when the framing of the pandemic by
the nation state is experienced to misfire. However, in these cases,
the object of fear is constituted as the “state within the state”, that
tries to hurt the people by imposing draconian restrictions,
implanting microchips in people during vaccination and so on.
Here the people are put into war with the “deep state”, instead of
being the national subjects of the state in war with other non-
nationals. A political ontology constructing an antagonism in
relation to “the deep state” has been extremely visible in the
protests in the US, a reason for this could have been the fact that
Trump continuously downplayed the importance of the virus which
gave credit to the demonstrators’ claims about the virus not being
dangerous, while lockdown measures were simultaneously being
imposed by other government levels, leading to a more complex
target for the dissent. As has been noted by for example Pantucci and
Ong, 2021 the “propaganda linked to COVID-19” that these anti-
statist groups disseminate “has focused on racist, anti-Semitic, and
other tropes” (6), the consipracies that these fringe groups focus on
as objects of fear often seem to involve xenophobic elements. The
affective attunements behind many of the anti-lockdown protests
thus simultanously seems to lead to a questioning of the legitimacy of
the state, framing it as an object of fear, while at the same time being
implicated in the same kind of xenophobic outlook that the ontology
of war leads to in state-centric accounts as well.
Our discussion poses an obvious ethical and political issue that
brings us back to Butler’s theory. As Butler emphasises, the
recognizability of certain subjects is always partial: “The frame
never quite determined precisely what it is we see, think,
recognize, and apprehend. Something exceeds the frame that
troubles our sense of reality; in other words, something occurs
that does not conform to our established understanding of
things.” (Butler 2009, 9.) It is especially during the pandemic
that we have come to see the limits of the political ontology of war
as a basis for distinguishing those to be protected and those left
without protection. The traditional state system might have
helped us buy time to understand the situation, but ultimately
all frames, like Butler points out, are partial and they are all the
time being transcended. In the last section of our article, we will
discuss some takeaways of our analysis. It is not our task here to
speculate on the different ways that we could reorganize the basis
of our political communities in a way that does not try to establish
uniformity by means of locating an enemy. We simply want to
point out that our present political ontology is a terrible
foundation for governing during a pandemic.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The pandemic has brought to light the profoundly sad
situation we are in, the nation state seems to be unable to
allocate resources and work for the common good without any
other pretext than war. The frame of war that the nation state
puts into action thus reveals the significant inadequacy of the
political ontology that the nation state rests on, especially so
concerning the failure of this frame to capture the central
problematic of the virus. What the political ontology of war
amounts to is a splitting up of the world into several unified
bodies of subjects, closed off and walled in by the anxiety-
managing operations of the nation state. Concerning this
relationship between sovereignty, territory and bodies,
Butler notes that:
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If we accept the insight that our very survival depends
not on the policing of a boundary-the strategy of a
certain sovereign in relation to its territory-but on
recognizing how we are bound up with others, then
this leads us to reconsider the way in which we
conceptualize the body in the field of politics. We
have to consider whether the body is rightly defined
as a bounded kind of entity. (Butler 2009, 52.).
In the spirit of this ethos, the pandemic has underscored the
urgency of undertaking a sustained reflection concerning the political
ontology structuring our political subjectivity as well as the relations
between territories, sovereignties and bodies, both physical and
political, that this ontology produces. We know that the virus
does not stop at the border of any state. We know that the
solution to the pandemic cannot be a total closure of all nation
states for eternity, even though this might be the latent claim and
desire communicated through the political ontology of war. We also
know that we cannot, and should not, desire an extension of the
political ontology of the nation state to the whole globe. These
seemingly commonsensical statements should be taken to
structure the coming theoretical and practical work that remains
to be done and redone concerning the complex interwoven character
of political bodies and subjects.
As we construe it, the political problem posed by the pandemic is
not only rhetorical; it concerns the organization of politics in our
societies. It is rather the framing of the pandemic as something other
than war that seems tempting and that calls on us to think about the
political ontology of the political community and its structures in a
way that contests the political ontology of the nation state. In other
words, an analysis that takes note of political ontology will lead us to
notice how the rhetoric of war is not our primary problem, instead we
should focus onmore fundamental historical and social structures, the
feelings that anchor actors to these structures and the ways in which
the political praxis of the nation state is organized. In the political
sphere, it is not possible to direct affective expectations, desires and
fantasies towards the virus. Especially such expectations, desires and
fantasies that are grounded on hatred can within the frame of the
political ontology of the nation state only be directed against other
humans.We are not able to feel hatred towards the virus by leaning on
our political ontology, it is instead perceived through the frame of the
network of meanings that the nation state’s political ontology of war
leans on. This hatred that fantasises about war, has often been
understood (see for example Castoriadis 1991, 150–151) to stem
from narcissistic self-hatred and is directed towards the outside along
the axes provided by the friend-enemy-distinction and is founded on a
feeling that one wants others to be the same as oneself. As we have
argued the friend-enemy-distinction fails to structure us as subjects at
war with the virus and instead structures us as subjects at war with
other peoples. As Butler notes concerning the ontology of the nation
state: “Lives are divided into those representing certain kinds of states
and those representing threats to state-centered liberal democracy”.
(Butler, 2015, 54.). In this way, the ontology of war also creates a
moralistic and antagonistic position in relation to other nationalities.
According to Butler, the political ontology of war carries out a
binary division between subjects, where the protection of some
subjects is justified at the expense of others (Butler 2009, 31; 54).
A highly urgent development that proves Butler’s point is the
tendency of what often has been called “vaccine nationalism”, the
thought that one’s own nation should have priority access to the
vaccine at the expense of other nations. The discussions
concerning the distribution of vaccines display the full force of
the political ontology we in this article have analyzed, the
question of obtaining vaccines has also been framed through
the ontology of war as an “arms race” (see for example Evening
Standard 2020; Fortune 2020; New York Times 2020). That the
vaccine produced in Russia is called Sputnik, a throwback to a
cold-war era imperialism, reveals how even the object that is the
vaccine becomes a vessel of nationalistic pride. The basic
argument in defense of vaccine nationalism has been
presented by Ferguson and Caplan, as they argue that the
argument for a self-interested vaccine nationalism is morally
justified because of one’s primary commitment to one’s own
nation (Ferguson and Caplan 2020, 1–4). Needless to say, it is
“epidemiologically self-defeating and clinically
counterproductive” (Foreign Policy 2021) to defend vaccine
nationalism in the case of COVID-19, and it might even
ultimately work against the purported self-interest of the
nation state. However, vaccine nationalism—in line with our
argument—is a course of action that dominates the vaccine
politics of the US (see Bollyky and Bown 2020) and “other
countries—including China, India, the United Kingdom, and
members of the European Union” (Fidler 2021, 749).
The border between us and others, inherent to our institution of
political ontology, can however also be conceptualized in a way that
highlights the fragility of this border, our survival is always
dependent on others (Butler 2009, 44; 54). According to Butler,
no singular body can be understood to be self-sufficient, bodies are
always dependent on others. Butler’s conception of the ultimate
impossibility of localizing borders that would define who the survival
of any one singular body is dependent on is in stark contrast with the
theory of sovereignty, where the body gives itself to be protected
against the enemy in accordance with the ontology of war (2020, 49;
62). The pandemic testifies to the flickering character of drawing
such borders, and even for its impossibility. To end on an illustrative
example: ridding the world of smallpox required societies to
transgress the borders and the frame of the ontology of war and
to notice that a politics that seeks to counter a virus requires political
action that rises above antagonism.18
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